



President Trump speaks at the January 6th Ellipse rally.

Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images



## 7

### 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION

At 1:10 p.m. on January 6th, President Trump concluded his speech at the Ellipse. By that time, the attack on the U.S. Capitol had already begun. But it was about to get much worse. The President told thousands of people in attendance to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol. He told them to “fight like hell” because if they didn’t, they were “not going to have a country anymore.” Not everyone who left the Ellipse did as the Commander-in-Chief ordered, but many of them did. The fighting intensified during the hours that followed.<sup>1</sup>

By 1:21 p.m., President Trump was informed that the Capitol was under attack. He could have interceded immediately. But the President chose not to do so. It was not until 4:17 p.m. that President Trump finally tweeted a video in which he told the rioters to go home.

The 187 minutes between the end of President Trump’s speech and when he finally told the mob to leave the U.S. Capitol was a dereliction of duty. In the U.S. military, a service member is deemed to be “derelict in the performance of duties when that person willfully or negligently fails to perform that person’s duties or when that person performs them in a culpably inefficient manner.”<sup>2</sup> As Commander-in-Chief, President Trump had the power—more than any other American—to muster the U.S. Government’s resources and end the attack on the U.S. Capitol. He willfully remained idle even as others, including his own Vice President, acted.

President Trump could have called top officials at the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the F.B.I., the Capitol Police Department, or the DC Mayor’s Office to ensure that they quelled the violence. He made no such calls. Instead, President Trump reached out to Rudolph Giuliani and friendly Members of Congress, seeking their assistance in delaying the joint session of Congress. And the President tweeted at 2:24 p.m., at the height of the violence, that his own Vice President lacked the “courage” to act—a statement that could only further enrage the mob. Meanwhile, Vice President Michael Pence assumed

the duties of the President, requesting the assistance of top officials, even though he was not in the chain of command and had no constitutional power to issue orders.

In testimony before the Select Committee, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley explained that President Trump did “[n]othing,” “[z]ero” to marshal the Government’s resources during the assault on the U.S. Capitol.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, Vice President Pence had “two or three calls” with General Milley and other military officials—even as the mob hunted him. During those calls, Vice President Pence was “very animated” and “issued very explicit, very direct, unambiguous orders.” The Vice President told Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller to “get the military down here, get the [National] [G]uard down here,” and “put down this situation.”<sup>4</sup> President Trump could have made those same demands. He chose not to do so—a damning fact that President Trump’s own Chief of Staff, Mark Meadows, quickly tried to cover up.

“We have to kill the narrative that the Vice President is making all the decisions,” General Milley recalled Meadows as saying. “We need to establish the narrative, you know, that the President is still in charge and that things are steady or stable,” Meadows said, which General Milley described as a “[r]ed flag.”<sup>5</sup> In his testimony, General Milley also reflected on what it meant for a President not to be taking action in a time of crisis:

You know, you’re the Commander in Chief. You’ve got an assault going on on the Capitol of the United States of America, and there’s nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero? And it’s not my place to, you know, pass judgment or—I’m the, you know—but no attempt to call the Secretary of Defense? No attempt to call the Vice President of the United States of America, who’s down on the scene? To my knowledge, it wasn’t—I just noted it.<sup>6</sup>

President Trump’s closest advisors—both inside and out of the White House—implored him to act sooner. Earlier in the week, two of the President’s most trusted aides, Eric Herschmann and Hope Hicks, both wanted President Trump to emphasize that January 6th would be a peaceful protest. President Trump refused.<sup>7</sup>

On the 6th, as the riot began to escalate, a colleague texted Hicks and wrote, “Hey, I know you’re seeing this. But he really should tweet something about Being NON-violent.”<sup>8</sup> “I’m not there,” Hicks replied. “I suggested it several times Monday and Tuesday and he refused.”<sup>9</sup>

Once the attack was underway, President Trump initially ignored the counsel of his own family, members of his administration, Republican elected officials, and friendly Fox News personalities. Both Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump, Jr. wanted their father to tell the rioters to go home

sooner. The President delayed. At 2:38 p.m., President Trump sent this tweet: "Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!"<sup>10</sup> Sarah Matthews, the White House Deputy Press Secretary, told the Select Committee that President Trump resisted using the word "peaceful." The President added the words "Stay peaceful!" only after Ivanka Trump suggested the phrase.<sup>11</sup> Trump, Jr. quickly recognized that his father's tweet was insufficient. "He's got to condemn [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough," Trump, Jr. wrote in a text to White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows.<sup>12</sup> President Trump did not tell the rioters to disperse in either his 2:38 p.m. tweet, or another tweet at 3:13 p.m.<sup>13</sup>

Multiple witnesses told the Select Committee that Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy contacted the President and others around him, desperately trying to get him to act. McCarthy's entreaties led nowhere. "I guess they're just more upset about the election theft than you are," President Trump told McCarthy.<sup>14</sup> Top lawyers in the White House Counsel's Office attempted to intercede. Two Fox News primetime personalities, always so obsequious, begged those around the President to get him to do more. But President Trump was unmoved.

There's no question that President Trump had the power to end the insurrection. He was not only the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. military, but also of the rioters.

One member of the mob, Stephen Ayres, told the Select Committee that he and others quickly complied as soon as President Trump finally told them to go home. "[W]e literally left right after [President Trump's 4:17 p.m. video] come out. You know, to me if he would have done that earlier in the day, 1:30 [p.m.] . . . maybe we wouldn't be in this bad of a situation or something," Ayres said.<sup>15</sup> Another rioter, Jacob Chansley, commonly referred to as the "QAnon Shaman," was one of the first 30 rioters to enter the U.S. Capitol. Chansley told a reporter that he left the building because "Trump asked everybody to go home."<sup>16</sup> At 4:25 p.m., just eight minutes after President Trump tweeted his video, an Oath Keeper named Ed Vallejo messaged other members of his group, a fair number of whom were at the Capitol: "Gentleman [sic], Our Commander-in-Chief has just ordered us to go home. Comments?"<sup>17</sup>

Even then, President Trump did not disavow the rioters. He endorsed their cause, openly sympathized with them, and repeated his Big Lie once again. "I know your pain, I know you're hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us," President Trump said at the beginning of his 4:17 p.m. video. "It was a landslide election, and everyone knows it, especially the other side. But you have to go home now. We have to have peace. We have



President Trump appears on a monitor in the White House briefing room depicting a video he released instructing rioters to go home.

(Photo by Joshua Roberts/Getty Images)

to have law and order. We have to respect our great people in law and order. We don't want anybody hurt." The President portrayed the violence as something his political foes would use against him, saying: "This was a fraudulent election, but we can't play into the hands of these people."<sup>18</sup>

The President concluded his short video by again praising the men and women who had overrun the U.S. Capitol. "We have to have peace. So go home. We love you. You're very special," President Trump said. "You've seen what happens. You see the way others are treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you feel, but go home, and go home in peace."<sup>19</sup>

Just after 6:00 p.m. on January 6th, President Trump issued his final tweet of the day, again lauding the rioters and justifying their cause. President Trump made excuses for the riot, saying this is what happens "when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long." The President added: "Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!"<sup>20</sup>

The following day, President Trump's advisors encouraged him to deliver a short speech denouncing the attack on the U.S. Capitol. The President struggled to deliver his prepared remarks. According to Cassidy

Hutchinson, President Trump wanted to say that he would pardon the rioters. Lawyers in the White House Counsel's Office objected, so this language was not included.<sup>21</sup> John McEntee, the Director of the White House Presidential Personnel Office, also testified that in the days following the attack, he heard President Trump mention the possibility of a "blanket pardon" for all those involved in the events of January 6th.<sup>22</sup>

President Trump never did give up on the prospect. Since leaving office, the now former President has said he would consider "full pardons with an apology to many" of the January 6th defendants if he is reelected.<sup>23</sup>

### 7.1 "REINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES"

President Trump tweeted three times on the morning of January 6th, repeating a false claim of election fraud at 8:06 a.m.,<sup>24</sup> pressuring Vice President Pence to delay the electoral count at 8:17 a.m.,<sup>25</sup> and urging Republican party officials to do the same at 8:22 a.m.<sup>26</sup> He made calls to his Republican allies in Congress, many of whom were already committed to objecting to the electoral count.<sup>27</sup> And he dialed his lawyers and advisors—including Steve Bannon and Rudolph Giuliani (twice), both of whom had been counseling the President on how to stay in power.<sup>28</sup>

There was one person—critical to his plan—whom President Trump tried to reach but couldn't. At 9:02 a.m., he asked the switchboard operator to call his Vice President. Vice President Pence did not answer the call.<sup>29</sup>

Instead, between 9:52 a.m. and 10:18 a.m., the President spoke with his speechwriter, Stephen Miller, about the words he would deliver at the Save America Rally just hours later.<sup>30</sup> The former President's speech had come together over the course of 36 hours, going from a screed aimed at encouraging congressional objections to one that would ultimately incite mob violence.<sup>31</sup>

Only four minutes after the call concluded, at 10:22 a.m., Miller emailed revisions to the speechwriters, instructing them to "[s]tart inputting these changes asap" that included "red highlights marking POTUS edits."<sup>32</sup> The President had made some cosmetic additions, like peppering in the word "corrupt" throughout,<sup>33</sup> but there was one substantive edit—a new target—that would focus the crowd's anger on one man.

None of the preceding drafts mentioned Vice President Pence whatsoever. But now, at the very last minute, President Trump slipped in the following sentences calling the Vice President out by name:

Today, we will see whether Republicans stand strong for the integrity of our elections. And we will see whether Mike Pence enters history as a truly great and courageous leader. All he has to do is



President Trump speaks with speechwriter Stephen Miller about his Ellipse speech in the Oval Office on the morning of January 6, 2021.

(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

refer the illegally-submitted electoral votes back to the states that were given false and fraudulent information where they want to recertify. With only 3 of the 7 states in question we win and become President and have the power of the veto.<sup>34</sup>

No one on the speechwriting team could explain why President Trump added these lines just 30 minutes before he was originally scheduled to speak at 11:00 a.m.<sup>35</sup> But by 10:49 a.m., Vincent Haley, a speechwriter who was helping load the teleprompter at the Ellipse, was told to hold off and delete the mention of the Vice President—for now.<sup>36</sup> Miller said that Eric Herschmann, a lawyer who was one of the President’s senior advisors, asked him in a “brief sidebar” that morning to omit reference to the Vice President and his role in the certification process because he “didn’t concur with the legal analysis” and that it “wouldn’t advance the ball” but would be “counterproductive” instead.<sup>37</sup> As detailed in Chapter 5, Herschmann and others in the White House were vocal critics of Dr. John Eastman’s theory, which claimed that the Vice President had the unilateral power to reject electors during the joint session of Congress. President Trump repeatedly pressured Pence to either reject certified electors, or delay the



President Trump on a phone call with Vice President Mike Pence in the Oval Office on the morning of January 6, 2021.

(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

electoral count based on Eastman’s unconstitutional and illegal theory. Vice President Pence would not budge. The Vice President consistently rejected President Trump’s demands.

After tweeting four more times that morning—all of them spreading lies about the election<sup>38</sup>—the President apparently thought he had one last chance to convince his number two to overrule the will of the American people.

As recounted in Chapter 5, President Trump called Vice President Pence at 11:17 a.m.<sup>39</sup> The call between the two men—during which the President soon grew “frustrat[ed] or heated,”<sup>40</sup> visibly upset,<sup>41</sup> and “angry”<sup>42</sup>—lasted nearly 20 minutes.<sup>43</sup> And President Trump insulted Vice President Pence when he refused to obstruct or delay the joint session.

After that call, General Keith Kellogg said that the people in the room immediately went back to editing the Ellipse speech.<sup>44</sup> At 11:30 a.m., Miller emailed his assistant, Robert Gabriel, with no text in the body but the subject line: “insert—stand by for phone call.”<sup>45</sup> At 11:33 a.m., Gabriel emailed the speechwriting team: “REINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES. Confirm receipt.”<sup>46</sup> One minute later, speechwriter Ross Worthington confirmed



President Trump looks backstage at the crowd gathered at the Ellipse.

(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

that he had reached Vincent Haley by phone.<sup>47</sup> Haley corroborated that he added one “tough sentence about the Vice President” while he was at the teleprompter.<sup>48</sup>

The final written draft had the following Pence reference: “And we will see whether Mike Pence enters history as a truly great and courageous leader.”<sup>49</sup> Haley wasn’t confident that line was what he reinserted, but email traffic and teleprompter drafts produced by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) indicate that he was mistaken.<sup>50</sup>

After defying President Trump’s pressure, Vice President Pence—and the ire of the President he inspired—was back in the speech.

After the heated call, President Trump’s personal assistant Nicholas Luna handed him a message on White House card stock and the President departed for the Ellipse to give his speech.<sup>51</sup> Preserved by NARA, the message read: “THEY ARE READY FOR YOU WHEN YOU ARE.”<sup>52</sup> When it finally came time for him to speak, President Trump repeatedly directed his anger at Vice President Pence—often ad-libbing lines that were not included in the draft text.

## 7.2 “I’LL BE THERE WITH YOU”

From a tent backstage at the Ellipse, President Trump looked out at the crowd of approximately 53,000 supporters and became enraged. Just under half of those gathered—a sizeable stretch of about 25,000 people<sup>53</sup>—refused to walk through the magnetometers and be screened for weapons,<sup>54</sup> leaving the venue looking half-empty to the television audience at home.

According to testimony received by the Committee, earlier that morning at the White House, the President was told that the onlookers were unwilling to pass through the magnetometers because they were armed. “We have enough space, sir. They don’t want to come in right now,” Deputy Chief of Staff Tony Ornato reportedly told President Trump. “They have weapons that they don’t want confiscated by the Secret Service.”<sup>55</sup>

So, when President Trump got to the rally site and could see the crowd for himself, “[h]e was fucking furious,” as Cassidy Hutchinson later texted Ornato.<sup>56</sup> Hutchinson testified that just minutes before addressing the crowd, President Trump shouted to his advance team: “I don’t [fucking] care that they have weapons. They’re not here to hurt *me*. Take the [fucking] mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from here. Take the [fucking] mags away.”<sup>57</sup>

By noon, President Trump took to the stage at the Ellipse.<sup>58</sup> The President wanted all of those in attendance, including those who hadn’t passed through the magnetometers, to come closer to the stage. “And I’d love to have if those tens of thousands of people would be allowed,” President Trump said. “But I’d love it if they could be allowed to come up here with us. Is that possible? Can you just let [them] come up, please?”<sup>59</sup>

President Trump repeatedly made it clear to those around him in the days before January 6th that he wanted to march to the Capitol alongside his supporters. That is, President Trump wanted to join his supporters in what the Secret Service refers to as an “off-the-record” movement (OTR).

While the President spoke, Hutchinson texted Ornato, “He also kept mentioning OTR to Capitol before he took the stage.”<sup>60</sup> Minutes before the President stepped out, Chief of Staff Mark Meadows assured the President he was working on it.<sup>61</sup>

President Trump’s plan to march appeared once in an early draft of the script, then a later revision was made to add the word “building” after “Capitol,” making it clear exactly where the crowd should go.<sup>62</sup> And the President repeatedly told the crowd that he would join them.

“[A]fter this, we’re going to walk down, and I’ll be there with you, we’re going to walk down, we’re going to walk down,” he said to the crowd. “[W]e’re going to walk down to the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on

our brave senators and congressmen and women, and we're probably not going to be cheering so much for some of them."<sup>63</sup>

President Trump used the phrase scripted for him by his White House speechwriters, "peacefully and patriotically" once, about 20 minutes into his speech.<sup>64</sup> Then he spent the next 50-or-so minutes amping up his crowd with lies about the election, attacking his own Vice President and Republican Members of Congress, and exhorting the crowd to fight. "And we fight. We fight like hell" the President said to a crowd that had already spent the day chanting, "Fight for Trump! Fight for Trump!," and that would keep up the chorus when storming the Capitol.<sup>65</sup>

Finally, he told the crowd where to go to "take back our country": "So we're going to, we're going to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue. I love Pennsylvania Avenue. And we're going to the Capitol, and we're going to try and give . . . we're going to try and give our Republicans, the weak ones because the strong ones don't need any of our help. We're going to try and give them the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country. So let's walk down Pennsylvania Avenue."<sup>66</sup>

When the President announced his intentions from the microphone, people listened.

House Republican Leader Representative. Kevin McCarthy called Hutchinson mid-speech:<sup>67</sup>

"Do you guys think you're coming to my office[?]" he asked her.<sup>68</sup> She assured him that they weren't coming at all.<sup>69</sup>

"Figure it out. Don't come up here," he replied.<sup>70</sup>

The announcement from the stage put the Secret Service on alert, prompting agents to designate over email a last-minute response team "to filter in with the crowds" on the President's "walk/motorcade over" to the Capitol and establish an emergency plan "if things go south."<sup>71</sup> White House security officials were monitoring the situation in real time, remarking that President Trump was "going to the Capitol" and that "they are finding the best route now."<sup>72</sup> Nonetheless, these staffers were in "a state of shock,"<sup>73</sup> because they knew—particularly if the President joined—this would "no longer [be] a rally."<sup>74</sup>

"[W]e all knew . . . that this was going to move to something else if he physically walked to the Capitol," an employee said. "I don't know if you want to use the word 'insurrection,' 'coup,' whatever. We all knew that this would move from a normal democratic . . . public event into something else."<sup>75</sup>

But the logistics made the move all but impossible.

It was complicated for the Secret Service to coordinate a presidential movement even on a normal day. But today was not a normal day. Tens of thousands of President Trump's supporters had flooded into downtown DC in the days before the rally, and the Secret Service would have to account for that unpredictability. By the end of the President's speech, it was clear that the crowd at the Capitol was growing violent.

At 1:19 p.m., a Secret Service agent wrote to Bobby Engel, the head of President Trump's Secret Service detail: "FYSA . . . [Capitol Police] having serious challenges securing [the Capitol]. Nine priority breach attempts at this time. OTR to anywhere near there is not advisable. Give me a call when free. Front Office concerned about OTR to [the Capitol]." <sup>76</sup>

### 7.3 THE PRESIDENT'S ANGER WHEN HE COULD NOT MARCH TO THE CAPITOL

President Trump concluded his remarks at 1:10 p.m. Luna heard the President mention his intention to join the march to the Capitol "after he finished his remarks." <sup>77</sup> Just before the President got into his vehicle, Meadows told him, "We're going to work on it, sir." <sup>78</sup> President Trump was seated in his motorcade vehicle by 1:17 p.m. <sup>79</sup>

The Committee received information informally from current and former members of the Secret Service and former White House staff relevant to what happened next—what a number of witnesses have described as an "angry," "irate," or "furious" interaction in the Presidential vehicle between the President and the Secret Service. <sup>80</sup> That initial information, received informally, shaped the Committee's questioning of witnesses. The Committee's principal concern was that the President *actually intended* to participate personally in the January 6th efforts at the Capitol, leading the effort to overturn the election either from inside the Chamber or from a stage outside the Capitol. The Committee regarded those facts as important because they are relevant to President Trump's intent on January 6th. But a book published by Mark Meadows in November 2021 made the categorical claim that the President *never* intended to travel to the Capitol that day. <sup>81</sup> Because the Meadows book conflicted sharply with information that was being received by the Committee, the Committee became increasingly wary that witnesses might intentionally conceal what happened.

In our initial informal discussion with the lead of the President's detail, Robert Engel confirmed that President Trump did wish to travel to the Capitol from the Ellipse, but stated that he did not recall many other details. <sup>82</sup> But the Committee also received information from Kayleigh McEnany and Cassidy Hutchinson that also directly contradicted Mark Meadows's book and provided considerably more detail. McEnany testified that

President Trump did indeed wish to travel to the Capitol on January 6th, and continued to have that goal even after returning from the Ellipse to the White House.<sup>83</sup> McEnany, who spoke with President Trump shortly after he returned to the White House, recalls him expressing a desire to go to the Capitol: “I recall him . . . saying that he wanted to physically walk and be a part of the march and then saying that he would ride the Beast if he needed to, ride in the Presidential limo.”<sup>84</sup> When asked, McEnany confirmed that “yes, he did seem sincere about wanting to do that.”<sup>85</sup> Hutchinson’s testimony was generally consistent with the information the Select Committee was receiving informally. Like McEnany, Hutchinson confirmed that the President did ask to be transported to Capitol Hill.<sup>86</sup> Many other White House witnesses would ultimately confirm that President Trump wished to travel to the Capitol on January 6th, comprehensively rebutting the false statements in Meadows’s book.<sup>87</sup>

Part of Hutchinson’s account was a second-hand description of what occurred in the Presidential vehicle, which built upon and was consistent with information the Committee has received informally.

Hutchinson testified that, when she returned from the Ellipse, Ornato was standing outside his office door when he “waved me down,” Hutchinson said. The two of them walked into Ornato’s office, and he shut the door behind them.<sup>88</sup> Engel was already there, sitting in a chair “looking down, kind of looking a little lost and kind of discombobulated.”<sup>89</sup>

According to Hutchinson, Ornato then recounted a struggle in the President’s car.<sup>90</sup> At no point during Ornato’s telling—or at any point thereafter—did Engel indicate that what Ornato relayed was untrue.<sup>91</sup>

Another witness, a White House employee with national security responsibilities, provided the Committee with a similar description: Ornato related the “irate” interaction in the presidential vehicle to this individual in Ornato’s White House office with Engel present.<sup>92</sup> And just as Hutchinson testified, this employee told the Select Committee that Engel listened to Ornato’s retelling of the episode and did not dispute it: “I don’t remember his specific body language, but . . . [h]e did not deny the fact that the President was irate.”<sup>93</sup> Engel testified that he does not recall either the conversation with Hutchinson or the similar conversation with the White House employee with national security responsibilities.<sup>94</sup>

The Committee regarded both Hutchinson and the corroborating testimony by the White House employee with national security responsibilities national security official as earnest and has no reason to conclude that either had a reason to invent their accounts. A different Secret Service



Cassidy Hutchinson describes a story relayed to her by Tony Ornato about President Trump's desire to go to the Capitol after the Ellipse speech on January 6th during a January 6th Select Committee hearing.

(Photo by Brandon Bell/Getty Images)

agent, who served on a protective detail at the White House and was present in the presidential motorcade at the Ellipse, provided this view:

Committee Staff: Just a couple of additional questions. Ms. Hutchinson has suggested to the Committee that you sympathized with her after her testimony, and believed her account. Is that accurate?

Witness: I have no—yeah, that's accurate. I have no reason—I mean, we—we became friends. We worked—I worked every day with her for 6 months. Yeah, she became a friend of mine. We had a good working relationship. I have no reason—she's never done me wrong. She's never lied that I know of. I don't have any reason—I don't—I don't distrust Ms. Hutchinson.<sup>95</sup>

Also, the White House employee with national security responsibilities indicated that knowledge of the angry altercation in the Presidential vehicle was known within the White House—and was “[water] cooler talk.”<sup>96</sup> In addition, Hutchinson has provided testimony to the Committee about efforts by her prior counsel, who was apparently paid by a Trump-funded

organization, to suggest that Hutchinson did not need to testify about the issue in the presidential vehicle, could suggest that she “did not recall” it, or should downplay it.<sup>97</sup>

To further corroborate the accounts received of President Trump’s intent to travel to the Capitol, the Committee interviewed a member of the Metropolitan Police who was also present in the motorcade, Officer Mark Robinson. Officer Robinson confirmed that he was aware contemporaneously of the “heated discussion” that took place in the Presidential vehicle:

Committee Staff: And was there any description of what was occurring in the car?

Mr. Robinson: No. Only that—the only description I received was that the President was upset and that he was adamant about going to the Capitol, and there was a heated discussion about that.

Committee Staff: When you say “heated,” is that your word, or is that the word that was described by the TS agent?

Mr. Robinson: No. The word described by the TS agent meaning that the President was upset, and he was saying there was a heated argument or discussion about going to the Capitol.

. . . .

Mr. Schiff: So about how many times would you say you’ve been part of that motorcade with the President?

Mr. Robinson: Probably over a hundred times.

Mr. Schiff: And, in that hundred times, have you ever witnessed another discussion of an argument or a heated discussion with the President where the President was contradicting where he was supposed to go or what the Secret Service believed was safe?

Mr. Robinson: No.<sup>98</sup>

The Committee also interviewed the Secret Service agent who was in the same car as Officer Robinson. That person shared a similar account, and confirmed that he did not take issue with Officer Robinson’s testimony: “[The driver of the Presidential car] said something to the effect of, ‘The President is pretty adamant that he wants to go to the Capitol,’” the agent said, recalling what he had heard on the 6th.<sup>99</sup>

In addition, the Committee interviewed the USSS Press Secretary, who communicated with both Engel and with the driver in the presidential vehicle after Hutchinson appeared publicly. That witness indicated that Engel’s account of the events confirmed that the President was indeed

angry, or furious.<sup>100</sup> In fact, when asked about a reporter's tweet indicating that sources within the Secret Service confirmed that "Trump was furious about not being [able] to go to [the] Capitol with his supporters," the Press Secretary said he "certainly corroborated it" with the reporter because "that's what I had been told, you know, that [the President] was upset, he was agitated, about not being able to go[.]"<sup>101</sup>

In addition to the testimony above, the Committee has reviewed hundreds of thousands of new Secret Service documents, including many demonstrating that the Secret Service had been informed of potential violence at the Capitol before the Ellipse rally on January 6th. (These documents were critical to our understanding of what the Secret Service and White House knew about the threat to the Capitol on January 6th.) The Committee has also more recently conducted additional interviews with Engel and Ornato, and has also interviewed the driver of the Presidential vehicle.

Both Engel and the driver<sup>102</sup> testified that, within 30 seconds of getting into the vehicle, the President asked if he could travel to the Capitol.<sup>103</sup> This again is directly inconsistent with the account of events in Meadows's book. According to Engel, he told the President immediately that the move wasn't happening.<sup>104</sup> The President was unhappy with Engel's response and began "pushing pretty hard to go."<sup>105</sup> The President repeatedly asked why he could not go to the Capitol.<sup>106</sup> Engel replied that the Secret Service "didn't have any people at the Capitol" to provide the President with appropriate security.<sup>107</sup> The President responded angrily, telling Engel and the driver "I'm the President and I'll decide where I get to go."<sup>108</sup> He reassured Engel that "it would essentially be fine and that the people there [meaning the people who were marching from the Ellipse to the Capitol at President Trump's instruction] were [Trump] supporters or something to that effect,"<sup>109</sup> According to the Secret Service agent driving the vehicle, the President was "animated and irritated" about not going to the Capitol.<sup>110</sup>

According to Mr. Engel, he ultimately told the President that they would "assess what our options were and wait until we can get a plan in place before we went down there."<sup>111</sup> We note that the driver's account acknowledged President Trump's anger to a greater degree than either Engel's initial account in Spring 2022, or his more recent account in November 2022. Engel did not characterize the exchange in the vehicle the way Hutchinson described the account she heard from Ornato, and indicated that he did not recall President Trump gesturing toward him.<sup>112</sup> Engel did not recall being present when Ornato gave either Hutchinson or the White House employee with national security responsibilities an accounting of the events.<sup>113</sup> The driver testified that he did not recall seeing what President Trump was doing and did not recall whether there was movement.<sup>114</sup>

The Select Committee has great respect for the men and women of the Secret Service. That said, it is difficult to fully reconcile the accounts of several of the witnesses who provided information with what we heard from Engel and Ornato.<sup>115</sup> But the principal factual point here is clear and undisputed: President Trump specifically and repeatedly requested to be taken to the Capitol. He was insistent and angry, and continued to push to travel to the Capitol even after returning to the White House.

The motorcade didn't disband upon arriving to the White House, as they usually do. Instead, they were instructed to stand by in case the President's move to the Capitol did indeed happen.<sup>116</sup> The Select Committee received a document from the Secret Service that reflects that at 1:25 p.m., "PPD IS ADVISING THAT [THE PRESIDENT] IS PLANNING ON HOLDING AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE NEXT APPROXIMATE TWO HOURS, THEN MOVING TO THE CAPITOL."<sup>117</sup> "They had not made a decision whether or not we were going to transport the President to the Capitol," Robinson was told.<sup>118</sup>

Engel testified that he went to Ornato's office when he returned to the West Wing in order to discuss a possible move to the Capitol by President Trump.<sup>119</sup> Given the deteriorating security conditions at the Capitol, it was quickly determined that they could not safely transport the President there.<sup>120</sup> The motorcade waited on West Executive Drive approximately 40 minutes before finally receiving word from the Secret Service that the move had been officially nixed. Internal Secret Service communications bear this out: Not until 1:55 p.m. did Engel notify other agents via email that "[w]e are not doing an OTR to [the Capitol]."<sup>121</sup>

#### **7.4 "WE'RE GOING TO TRY TO GET THE PRESIDENT TO PUT OUT A STATEMENT"**

Minutes after arriving back at the White House, the President ran into a member of the White House staff and asked whether he or she watched his speech on television.<sup>122</sup>

"Sir, they cut it off because they're rioting down at the Capitol," the employee said.

The President asked what he or she meant by that.

"[T]hey're rioting down there at the Capitol," the employee repeated.

"Oh really?" the President asked. "All right, let's go see."<sup>123</sup>

A photograph taken by the White House photographer—the last one permitted until later in the day—captures the moment the President heard the news from the employee at 1:21 p.m.<sup>124</sup> By that time, if not sooner, he had been made aware of the violent riot at the Capitol.

President Trump walked through the corridor from the Oval Office into the Presidential Dining Room and sat down at the table with the television remote and a Diet Coke close at hand.<sup>125</sup> For the rest of the afternoon—as his country faced an hours-long attack—he hunkered down in or around the dining room, watching television.<sup>126</sup> He left only for a few minutes—from 4:03 p.m. to 4:07 p.m.—to film a video in the Rose Garden, only a few steps away, after hours of arm-twisting.<sup>127</sup> But otherwise, the President remained in the dining room until 6:27 p.m., when he returned to his private residence.<sup>128</sup>

What happened during the 187 minutes from 1:10 p.m. to 4:17 p.m., when President Trump finally told the rioters to go home, is—from an official standpoint—undocumented.

For instance, the Presidential Daily Diary—the schedule that tracks every meeting and phone call in which the President partakes—is inexplicably blank between 1:21 p.m. and 4:03 p.m.<sup>129</sup> When asked to explain the gap in record-keeping on and around January 6th, White House officials in charge of its maintenance provided no credible explanation, including: “I don’t recall a specific reason.”<sup>130</sup>

The men who spent most of the afternoon in that room with the President, Mark Meadows and Dan Scavino, both refused to comply with lawful subpoenas from the Select Committee.<sup>131</sup> Others in the dining room appeared before the Select Committee but cited executive privilege to avoid answering questions about their direct communications with President Trump.<sup>132</sup> Others who worked just outside of the Oval Office, like the President’s personal secretaries Molly Michael and Austin Ferrer Piran Basauldo, claimed not to remember nearly anything from one of the most memorable days in recent American history.<sup>133</sup>

The White House photographer, Shealah Craighead, had been granted access to photograph the President during his January 6th speech, but once she got to the White House—and it became clear that an attack was unfolding on the Capitol’s steps—she was turned away.<sup>134</sup>

“The President [didn’t] want any photos,” she was told.<sup>135</sup>

Here’s what President Trump did during the 187 minutes between the end of his speech and when he finally told rioters to go home: For hours, he watched the attack from his TV screen.<sup>136</sup> His channel of choice was Fox News.<sup>137</sup> He issued a few tweets, some on his own inclination and some only at the repeated behest of his daughter and other trusted advisors.<sup>138</sup> He made several phone calls, some to his personal lawyer Rudolph Giuliani, some to Members of Congress about continuing their objections to the electoral certification, even though the attack was well underway.<sup>139</sup>

Here's what President Trump did not do: He did not call any relevant law enforcement agency to ensure they were working to quell the violence. He did not call the Secretary of Defense; he did not call the Attorney General; he did not call the Secretary of Homeland Security.<sup>140</sup> And for hours on end, he refused the repeated requests—from nearly everyone who talked to him—to simply tell the mob to go home.<sup>141</sup>

Throughout the afternoon, senior staff regularly entered the room to give him updates on what was happening at the Capitol.<sup>142</sup> And, of course, President Trump used Twitter, where information is shared on an instantaneous basis.

Shortly after President Trump entered the dining room, White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany swung by to “check in with him” about the letter Vice President Pence released around 1:00 p.m. announcing that he would not, in fact, overturn the will of the voters.

The President, once again, brought up going to the Capitol.<sup>143</sup> McEnany recorded what he said in her notes, certain of which she later produced to the Select Committee: “POTUS wanted to walk to [sic] capital. Physically walk. He said fine ride beast,” referring to the nickname for the presidential vehicle. “Meadows said not safe enough[.]”<sup>144</sup>

Meadows told Hutchinson at some point in the day that “the President wasn't happy that Bobby [Engel] didn't pull it off for him,” meaning the trip to the Capitol, “and that Mark didn't work hard enough to get the movement on the books.”<sup>145</sup>

Despite the turmoil just outside its walls, the proceedings in the joint session—which had begun at 1:00 p.m.—were still ongoing, and the President was watching them on the television.<sup>146</sup> He was eager to know which senators were lodging objections on his behalf.<sup>147</sup> “Back there and he wants list of senators,” McEnany's notes read. “Who [sic] objecting to what. He's calling them one by one.”<sup>148</sup>

The Select Committee subpoenaed several Members of Congress who reportedly spoke with President Trump during the afternoon.<sup>149</sup> None of them complied.<sup>150</sup>

Cellular records obtained by the Select Committee suggest that President Trump was on the phone with his lawyer Rudolph Giuliani at least twice during this period. Giuliani's phone connected with the White House switchboard for 3 minutes and 53 seconds at 1:39 p.m. and again for more than 8 minutes at 2:03 p.m.<sup>151</sup> Between the two calls, at 1:49 p.m., President Trump tweeted a link to a video of his speech from the Ellipse.<sup>152</sup>

Before 1:57 p.m., Herschmann phoned Senior Advisor to the President Jared Kushner—who was on a plane travelling home from overseas—advising him that “people are trying to break into the Capitol” and that “this is getting pretty ugly.”<sup>153</sup>

“We’re going to see what we can do here,” Herschmann said. “We’re going to try to get the President to put out a statement.”<sup>154</sup>

## 7.5 “HE DOESN’T WANT TO DO ANYTHING”

Throughout the afternoon, the President’s advisors tried to get him to tell the mob to leave the Capitol, but to no avail.

Ben Williamson, the White House Acting Director of Communications, watched on the news as officers and rioters pepper sprayed each other and crowds used bicycle barricades to push against officers holding the line.<sup>155</sup> He and Sarah Matthews, the Deputy Press Secretary, devised a plan: He would go to Meadows and she would go to McEnany to urge that the President issue a statement.<sup>156</sup> Williamson first texted Meadows:

“Would recommend POTUS put out a tweet about respecting the police over at the Capitol.”<sup>157</sup>

Minutes later, around 2:05 p.m., Hutchinson found Meadows seated in his office on the couch, absorbed by his cell phone screen.<sup>158</sup>

“Are you watching the TV, chief?” she asked. He indicated he was.

“Have you talked to the President?” she asked.

“No,” he replied. “He wants to be alone right now.”<sup>159</sup>

Rioters broke into the west side of the Capitol building around 2:13 p.m.<sup>160</sup> Just a few minutes later, Hutchinson saw Cipollone “barreling down the hallway” and—after looking at Hutchinson and shaking his head—opened the door to Meadows’s office unannounced.<sup>161</sup> Meadows was right where she left him, “still sitting on his phone.”<sup>162</sup>

“The rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go down and see the President now,” she heard Cipollone say.<sup>163</sup> Cipollone would not confirm or deny any of this exchange, citing executive privilege.<sup>164</sup>

“He doesn’t want to do anything, Pat,” Meadows said, peering up from his phone.<sup>165</sup>

“Mark something needs to be done, or people are going to die and the blood’s gonna be on your [fucking] hands,” Cipollone said. “This is getting out of control. I’m going down there.”<sup>166</sup>

Meadows finally stood up from the couch and walked with Cipollone toward the dining room to meet with the President.<sup>167</sup>

## 7.6 “HE THINKS MIKE DESERVES IT”

At exactly 2:24 p.m., President Trump made his first public statement during the attack on the Capitol by tweet. It read nothing like the statement his advisors had envisioned. It read:

Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!<sup>168</sup>

Minutes later, Meadows and Cipollone returned from their talk with the President.<sup>169</sup> No statement was forthcoming.

“Mark, we need to do something more. They’re literally calling for the Vice President to be [fucking] hung,” Hutchinson heard Cipollone say.<sup>170</sup>

“You heard him, Pat,” Meadows replied. “He thinks Mike deserves it. He doesn’t think they’re doing anything wrong.”<sup>171</sup>

“This is [fucking] crazy. We need to be doing something more,” Cipollone said.<sup>172</sup>

Cipollone told the Select Committee that “there needed to be an immediate and forceful response, statement, public statement, that people need to leave the Capitol now.”<sup>173</sup> He said he was “pretty clear” about his view in the White House that day, and he made that view known as soon as he became aware of the unrest.<sup>174</sup> He would not comment on how the President responded, or on this conversation with Meadows, citing executive privilege.<sup>175</sup> He did indicate that everyone in the White House—except President Trump—agreed that people needed to leave the Capitol:

Vice Chair Cheney: And who on the staff did not want people to leave the Capitol?

Mr. Cipollone: On the staff?

Vice Chair Cheney: In the White House.

Mr. Cipollone: I can’t think of anybody on that day who didn’t want people to get out of the Capitol once the—particularly once the violence started. No. I mean—

Mr. Schiff: What about the President?

Vice Chair Cheney: Yeah.

Mr. Cipollone: Well, she said the staff. So I answered.

Vice Chair Cheney: No. I said in the White House.



Noose set up outside of the Capitol on January 6, 2021.

(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

Mr. Cipollone: Oh, I'm sorry. I apologize. I thought you said who else on the staff. [*Pauses to confer with counsel*] Yeah. I can't reveal communications. But obviously I think, you know—yeah.<sup>176</sup>

What the President *did* tweet—a broadside at his Vice President—enlarged the target on Vice President Pence's back. A Secret Service agent in the Protective Intelligence Division, tasked with monitoring threats against protectees in part by scouring social media, told his colleagues the tweet was “probably not going to be good for Pence.”<sup>177</sup>

A second agent in reply noted that it had garnered “[o]ver 24K likes in under 2 mins.”<sup>178</sup>

## 7.7 “I GUESS THEY’RE JUST MORE UPSET ABOUT THE ELECTION THEFT THAN YOU ARE”

Minutes after drawing increased attention to his besieged Vice President, the President called newly elected Senator Tommy Tuberville of Alabama at 2:26 p.m.<sup>179</sup> He misdialled, calling Senator Mike Lee of Utah instead, but one passed the phone to the other in short order.<sup>180</sup>

President Trump wanted to talk objections to the electoral count. But Senator Tuberville—along with every other elected official trapped and surrounded in the building—had other things on his mind.<sup>181</sup>

“I said, ‘Mr. President, they’ve taken the Vice President out. They want me to get off the phone, I gotta go,’” Senator Tuberville told reporters.<sup>182</sup> “‘[W]e’re not doing much work here right now.’”<sup>183</sup>

In the next half hour, between 2:26 p.m. and 3:06 p.m., President Trump spoke with House Leader Kevin McCarthy.<sup>184</sup>

Leader McCarthy told the public in a live interview with CBS News, while he and his colleagues were sheltering at a secure location,<sup>185</sup> that he was “very clear” in telling President Trump “to talk to the nation to tell them to stop this.”<sup>186</sup>

Leader McCarthy later recounted his conversation to a number of people, including Representative Jaime Herrera Beutler, a Republican congresswoman from Washington State.<sup>187</sup> “You have got to get on TV, you’ve got to get on Twitter, you’ve got to call these people off,” he said he told the President.<sup>188</sup>

“[These] aren’t my people, you know, these are—these are Antifa,” President Trump insisted, against all evidence.<sup>189</sup> “They’re your people. They literally just came through my office windows, and my staff are running for cover. I mean, they’re running for their lives. You need to call them off,” Leader McCarthy told him.<sup>190</sup>

What President Trump said next was “chilling,” in Representative Herrera Beutler’s words.<sup>191</sup>

“Well, Kevin, I guess they’re just more upset about the election theft than you are,” the President said.<sup>192</sup>

The call then devolved into a swearing match.<sup>193</sup>

Mick Mulvaney, former Chief of Staff to President Trump, had a similar call with Leader McCarthy in the days after the attack. McCarthy told Mulvaney that he urged the President to get the rioters to stop, and the President replied, “Kevin, maybe these people are just more angry about this than you are.”<sup>194</sup>

Marc Short, the Vice President’s Chief of Staff, spoke with Leader McCarthy later that afternoon.<sup>195</sup> Leader McCarthy told Short that he had spoken with President Trump and that he was “frustrat[ed]” that the White House was “not taking the circumstance as seriously as they should at that moment.”<sup>196</sup> The administration was demonstrating a “lack of response or lack of responsibility,” Leader McCarthy told Short.<sup>197</sup>

At 2:49 p.m.—as the violence escalated—President Trump’s speechwriter Gabriel Robert texted someone: “Potus im sure is loving this.”<sup>198</sup>

## 7.8 “STAY PEACEFUL!”

No one was getting through to the President.

So Herschmann went to Ivanka Trump’s office, hoping she would come to the dining room and be “a calming influence” on her father.<sup>199</sup> Herschmann “just sort of barged in” and told her to turn on the television.<sup>200</sup> After taking in a few of the violent scenes together, Herschmann and Ivanka Trump left the room and walked to the dining room, where her father was holed up.<sup>201</sup>

At 2:38 p.m., the President issued a tweet:<sup>202</sup>

Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!<sup>203</sup>

Ivanka Trump told the Select Committee that the President “did not push back on [her] suggestion” to issue the tweet, and that it was either she or President Trump himself who suggested the last line, “Stay peaceful!”<sup>204</sup> She confirmed there may have been some tweaking of the wording.<sup>205</sup> McEnany, who was in the room at the time, wrote in her notes that “I say add ‘we support PEACEFUL protest.’ Ivanka add stay peaceful! Instead.”<sup>206</sup> To the Select Committee, McEnany echoed Ivanka Trump that the President wasn’t resistant in any way to putting out the message.<sup>207</sup>

But in private, McEnany told a different story to her deputy Sarah Matthews.

Back in the White House press office, Matthews told McEnany that the tweet did not go far enough in condemning the violence.<sup>208</sup> McEnany— noting that other staffers in the room were distracted—said “in a hushed tone . . . that the President did not want to include any sort of mention of peace in that tweet.”<sup>209</sup>

That took “some convincing on their part,” McEnany said, and “it wasn’t until Ivanka Trump suggested the phrase ‘Stay peaceful!’ that he finally agreed to include it.”<sup>210</sup>

Ivanka Trump repeatedly returned to the dining room to counsel her father throughout the day. It has been reported that each time Ivanka Trump “thought she had made headway” with her father, Meadows would call her “to say the [P]resident still needed more persuading”—a cycle that repeated itself over “several hours” that afternoon.<sup>211</sup> After one such trip, Ivanka Trump told the Select Committee she went to her husband’s office next door because she needed to “regroup” and collect herself.<sup>212</sup>

Several witnesses corroborated pieces of this account. General Kellogg said he saw Ivanka Trump coming and going from the dining room at least twice that afternoon.<sup>213</sup> Hutchinson said that it was “several times.”<sup>214</sup> Once, Ivanka Trump reportedly left her father with a look on her face as if



Sarah Matthews testifies at a January 6th Select Committee hearing.

(Photo by House Creative Services)

“[s]he had just had a tough conversation.”<sup>215</sup> Radford, Ivanka Trump’s Chief of Staff, saw that she was “[v]isibly upset” but continued going “down there when people were asking her to be down there and trying to get action taken.”<sup>216</sup>

Radford told the Select Committee that Ivanka Trump believed that “[s]omething should be said or put out that was even stronger.”<sup>217</sup>

Hutchinson, too, recalled Ivanka Trump dropping by Meadows’s office alongside Cipollone and talking about trying to convince her father to say something “more direct than he had wanted to at that time and throughout the afternoon.”<sup>218</sup>

“I remember her saying at various points,” Hutchinson said, “she wanted her dad to send them home. She wanted her dad to tell them to go home peacefully, and she wanted to include language that he necessarily wasn’t on board with at the time.”<sup>219</sup>

## 7.9 “THE PRESIDENT NEEDS TO STOP THIS ASAP”

President Trump’s 2:38 p.m. tweet did not condemn the violence at the Capitol. It did not tell rioters to leave the building.



Testimony footage of former White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany is played during a January 6th Select Committee hearing.

(Photo by Pool/Getty Images)

In the minutes before the tweet, Fox News—on the President’s screen—relayed that the Capitol was on lockdown;<sup>220</sup> that Capitol police officers were injured; that rioters were in the building and “just feet from the House chamber.”<sup>221</sup> In the minutes afterward, networks would report there was tear gas in the Capitol, forcing Members of Congress to evacuate in protective masks.<sup>222</sup> At 2:39 p.m., Secret Service agents reported that “[m]ore just got in.”<sup>223</sup>

“I don’t know how they’re gonna retake the Capitol building back at this point,” one agent wrote to others two minutes later.<sup>224</sup>

At 2:44 p.m., a Capitol police officer shot a rioter named Ashli Babbitt.<sup>225</sup> A handwritten note—dashed off onto a White House pocket card and preserved by the National Archives—read: “1x civilian gunshot wound to chest @ door of House cha[m]ber.”<sup>226</sup> One White House employee saw the note on the dining table in front of President Trump.<sup>227</sup>

A barrage of text messages inundated Meadows’s phone with a consistent plea.<sup>228</sup> Everyone from conservative media personalities to Republican allies in Congress—and even the President’s own family—urged the President to do more:

Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, 2:28 p.m.: “Mark I was just told there is an active shooter on the first floor of the Capitol Please tell the President to calm people[.] This isn’t the way to solve anything.”<sup>229</sup>

Laura Ingraham, 2:32 p.m.: “Hey Mark, The [sic] president needs to tell people in the Capitol to go home.” “This is hurting all of us.” “He is destroying his legacy and playing into every stereotype . . . we lose all credibility against the BLM/Antifa crowd if things go South.” “You can tell him I said this.”<sup>230</sup>

Mick Mulvaney, 2:35 p.m.: “Mark: he needs to stop this, now. Can I do anything to help?”<sup>231</sup>

Representative Barry Loudermilk, 2:44 p.m.: “It’s really bad up here on the hill.” “They have breached the Capitol.”<sup>232</sup> At 2:48 p.m., Meadows responded: “POTUS is engaging.”<sup>233</sup> At 2:49 p.m., Loudermilk responded: “Thanks. This doesn’t help our cause.”<sup>234</sup>

Representative William Timmons, 2:46 p.m.: “The president needs to stop this ASAP.”<sup>235</sup> At 2:49 p.m., Meadows responded: “We are doing it.”<sup>236</sup>

Donald Trump, Jr., 2:53 p.m.: “He’s got to condem [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough.”<sup>237</sup> Meadows responded: “I am pushing it hard. I agree.”<sup>238</sup> Later, Trump, Jr., continued: “This his [sic] one you go to the mattresses on. They will try to fuck his entire legacy on this if it gets worse.”<sup>239</sup>

White House staff discussed issuing yet another, stronger statement to address the ongoing—and escalating—violence. Around 3:00 p.m., one proposal was written in block capital letters on a pocket card from the chief of staff’s office:

ANYONE WHO ENTERED THE CAPITOL ~~ILLEGALLY~~ WITHOUT  
PROPER AUTHORITY SHOULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY[.]<sup>240</sup>

The handwriting appears to have been scrawled quickly and somewhat messily. Hutchinson recalled Meadows returning from the dining room with the note in hand and placing it on her desk.<sup>241</sup> The word “illegally” had been newly crossed out.<sup>242</sup>

But there would be no further action, Meadows told her.<sup>243</sup>

At 3:13 p.m., 35 minutes after his last tweet, the President issued another tweet. Rather than coming out with a stronger statement, the 3:13 p.m. tweet largely parroted the one preceding it:



Guns are drawn in the House Chamber on January 6th as rioters attempt to break in.  
(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order—respect the Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!<sup>244</sup>

Ivanka Trump—who was in the room when her father published the message—told the Select Committee that “the gravity of the situation” made her feel “that it would be helpful to tweet again.”<sup>245</sup> “The [earlier] tweet didn’t stop the violence,” Herschmann said.<sup>246</sup>

This tweet—like the last one—didn’t tell the rioters to go home. It suggested that they “remain” at the Capitol, albeit peacefully.

## 7.10 “WE LOVE YOU. YOU’RE VERY SPECIAL”

The President’s tweets were not tamping down on the violence, and White House staff knew it.<sup>247</sup> By 3:17 p.m., Fox News was reporting gunshots on Capitol Hill. Law enforcement officers could be seen in the House chamber, pointing guns over the barricaded door: The chyron blared “Guns Drawn on House Floor.”<sup>248</sup> Between 3:29 p.m. and 3:42 p.m., the network was flashing images of a protestor in the presiding officer’s chair, right where Vice

President Pence had been sitting 90 minutes earlier.<sup>249</sup> Other images showed Members of Congress trapped in the House gallery, crouching below the balcony for cover.<sup>250</sup>

Allies continued to text Meadows, begging the President to order the mob to go home and indicating that it was time the American people hear from the President directly:

Unknown, 3:04 p.m.: “Are you with potus right now? Hearing he is in the dining room watching this on TV . . .” “Is he going to say anything to de-escalate apart from that Tweet?”<sup>251</sup>

Reince Priebus, 3:09 p.m.: “TELL THEM TO GO HOME !!!”<sup>252</sup>

Unknown, 3:13 p.m.: “POTUS should go on air and defuse this. Extremely important.”<sup>253</sup>

Alyssa Farah, 3:13 p.m.: “Potus has to come out firmly and tell protestors to dissipate. Someone is going to get killed . . .”<sup>254</sup>

Representative Chip Roy, 3:25 p.m.: “Fix this now.”<sup>255</sup> Meadows responded: “We are.”<sup>256</sup>

Sean Hannity (Fox News), 3:31 p.m.: “Can he make a statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully leave the capital [sic].”<sup>257</sup> Meadows responded: “On it.”<sup>258</sup>

Katrina Pierson, 3:40 p.m.: “Note: I was able to keep the crazies off the stage. I stripped all branding of those nutty groups and removed videos of all of the psychos. Glad it [sic] fought it.”<sup>259</sup>

Unknown, 3:42 p.m.: “Pls have POTUS call this off at the Capitol. Urge rioters to disperse. I pray to you.”<sup>260</sup>

Unknown, 3:57 p.m.: “Is he coming out?” “He has to right?”<sup>261</sup>

Brian Kilmeade, 3:58 p.m. (Fox News): “Please get him on tv. Destroying every thing you guys have accomplished.”<sup>262</sup>

Donald Trump, Jr., 4:05 p.m.: “We need an oval address. He has to lead now. It’s gone too far and gotten out of hand.”<sup>263</sup>

At any moment in the afternoon, it would have been easy for President Trump to get before cameras and call off the attack. The White House Press Briefing Room is just down the hallway from the Oval Office, past the Cabinet Room and around the corner to the right. It would have taken less than 60 seconds for the President to get there.<sup>264</sup> The space, moreover, is outfitted with cameras that are constantly “hot,” meaning that they are on and ready to go live at a moment’s notice.<sup>265</sup> The White House press corps is



also situated in the West Wing, right by the briefing room.<sup>266</sup> The whole affair could have been assembled in minutes.<sup>267</sup>

However, it was not until nearly 3 hours after the violence began that President Trump finally agreed to tell the mob to go home.<sup>268</sup>

The Presidential Daily Diary notes that President Trump left the dining room to shoot the video at 4:03 p.m.<sup>269</sup> By this point—per Fox News coverage playing continually in the dining room—more law enforcement officers had arrived at the Capitol to resist the violent mob.<sup>270</sup>

The video shoot took place in the Rose Garden, the outdoor space that borders the Oval Office and the West Wing.<sup>271</sup> The setup was not ornate, just a camera and a microphone. Luna made sure that the background and lighting looked good, and that President Trump's hair and tie were in place.<sup>272</sup> President Trump delivered his remarks in one take, more or less, although he stopped and restarted at one point.<sup>273</sup> In all, the video took less than 4 minutes to shoot, and the President was back in the dining room by 4:07 p.m.<sup>274</sup>

"I would stick to this script . . . ," McEnany told President Trump before he stepped out to film.<sup>275</sup>

He didn't.

Kushner and others had drafted a statement, but President Trump spoke entirely off the cuff.<sup>276</sup> Here's what he said:

I know your pain. I know you're hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us. It was a landslide election and everyone knows it, especially the other side. But you have to go home now. We have to have peace. We have to have law and order. We have to respect our great people in law and order. We don't want anybody hurt. It's a very tough period of time. There's never been a time like this where such a thing happened where they could take it away from all of us, from me, from you, from our country. This was a fraudulent election. But we can't play into the hands of these people. We have to have peace. So go home, we love you. You're very special. You've seen what happens. You see the way others are treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you feel, but go home and go home in peace.<sup>277</sup>

A photo obtained from the National Archives shows President Trump and Herschmann huddled next to each other, watching a completed take through the monitor on the video camera.<sup>278</sup>

"There needs to be a more direct statement" telling the rioters to leave the Capitol, Luna heard Herschmann—yet again—tell the President.<sup>279</sup> Herschmann testified that he did not recall this exchange.<sup>280</sup>

But according to Luna, President Trump rejected the note.

"These people are in pain," he said in reply.<sup>281</sup>

Down at the Capitol, the video began streaming onto rioters' phones, and by all accounts including video footage taken by other rioters, they listened to President Trump's command.

"Donald Trump has asked everybody to go home," one rioter shouted as he "deliver[ed] the President's message." "That's our order," another rioter responded. Others watching the video responded: "He says, go home."<sup>282</sup>

The crowd afterward began to disperse.<sup>283</sup> The video made clear what had been evident to many, including those closest to him: The President could have called off the rioters far earlier and at any point that day.<sup>284</sup> But he chose not to do so.<sup>285</sup>

It was not until it was obvious that the riot would fail to stop the certification of the vote that the President finally relented and released a video statement made public at 4:17 p.m.<sup>286</sup>



President Trump huddles with aides, watching a completed take of a video through the monitor of the video camera.

(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)

### 7.11 “REMEMBER THIS DAY FOREVER!”

After leaving the Rose Garden, the President returned to the dining room. At 6:01 p.m., he issued another tweet, the last of the day:

These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!<sup>287</sup>

He retired to his residence for the evening at 6:27 p.m.<sup>288</sup> A White House photographer captured the President walking back to the residence with an employee in tow, carrying personal items President Trump wished to bring home with him for the night.<sup>289</sup> In the employee’s hands are the gloves the President was wearing while addressing the crowd at the Ellipse.<sup>290</sup>

The President had one parting comment to the employee—the thing that was evidently occupying his mind even after an afternoon of violence—before he retired to his home.

“Mike Pence let me down,” the President concluded.<sup>291</sup>

## 7.12 PRESIDENT TRUMP STILL SOUGHT TO DELAY THE JOINT SESSION

Even after President Trump finally told the rioters to go home, he and his lead attorney, Rudolph Giuliani, continued to seek to delay the joint session of Congress.

Giuliani began frantically calling the White House line the very minute that the President's video went up on Twitter.<sup>292</sup> Failing to get through, he called back, once every minute—4:17 p.m., 4:18 p.m., 4:19 p.m., 4:20 p.m.<sup>293</sup> He managed to get through, briefly, to Mark Meadows at 4:21 p.m., and then kept calling the White House line: at 4:22 p.m., three times on two different phones at 4:23 p.m., 4:24 p.m., and once more at 5:05 p.m.<sup>294</sup> He finally managed to speak with President Trump at 5:07 p.m., and the two spoke for almost 12 minutes.<sup>295</sup>

After he spoke with President Trump, Giuliani's phone calls went nearly without fail to Members of Congress: Senator Marsha Blackburn, and then Senator Mike Lee.<sup>296</sup> He made three calls to Senator Bill Hagerty, then two to Representative Jim Jordan.<sup>297</sup> He called Senator Lindsey Graham,<sup>298</sup> Senator Josh Hawley,<sup>299</sup> and Senator Ted Cruz.<sup>300</sup> Giuliani had two calls with Senator Dan Sullivan over the course of the evening.<sup>301</sup> There were another three calls to Representative Jordan, none of which connected.<sup>302</sup> After 8:06 p.m., when the joint session resumed, the calls to Members of Congress finally stopped.<sup>303</sup> Shortly afterward, at 8:39 p.m., Giuliani had one final call of 9 minutes with the President.<sup>304</sup>

When asked about these calls during his deposition before the Select Committee, Giuliani initially refused to answer. Giuliani insisted his calls to Members of Congress—none of whom were his client—were all attorney-client privileged.<sup>305</sup> But Giuliani eventually relented.

"I was probably calling to see any—if anything could be done," he said. "About the vote—the vote."<sup>306</sup>

We know definitively what Giuliani was up to because he left a voice message for Senator Tuberville—inadvertently on Senator Lee's phone—recording his request.<sup>307</sup> He wanted for "you, our Republican friends to try to just slow it down," referring to the electoral count, and delay the joint session.<sup>308</sup> Here are his own words:

The only strategy we can follow is to object to numerous States and raise issues so that we get ourselves into tomorrow—ideally until the end of tomorrow. So if you could object to every State and, along with a congressman, get a hearing for every State, I know we would delay you a lot, but it would give us the opportunity to get the legislators who are very, very close to pulling their vote.<sup>309</sup>



Mike Pence reopens the joint session of Congress and resumes counting electoral votes.

(Photo by Will McNamee/Getty Images)

The President, too, was at home, but he remained focused on his goal. Between 6:54 p.m. and 11:23 p.m., he spoke with 13 people, some more than once.<sup>310</sup> Of the 13, six ignored or expressly refused to comply with Select Committee requests for their testimony.<sup>311</sup> Two agreed to appear but refused to answer questions about their phone calls with the President, citing executive privilege.<sup>312</sup> Two more refused to answer questions, claiming attorney-client privilege.<sup>313</sup>

Of the 13, five were President Trump's attorneys or lawyers who worked with him on efforts to reverse the outcome of the election. With one exception, each of these calls took place before 8:06 p.m., when Vice President Pence reopened the joint session of Congress and resumed counting the electoral votes.<sup>314</sup> The President spoke with White House Counsel Pat Cipollone for 7 minutes at 7:01 p.m.<sup>315</sup> He spoke with Kurt Olsen and Mark Martin, lawyers who both advised him on the Vice President's role in the joint session:<sup>316</sup> He spoke with Martin for 9 minutes at 7:30 p.m., and Olsen twice, for 11 minutes at 7:17 p.m. and for another 10 minutes at 7:40 p.m.<sup>317</sup> He spoke with Cleta Mitchell, the lawyer leading his election challenges in Georgia, for 2 minutes at 7:53 p.m.<sup>318</sup> The President spoke with Herschmann for 5 minutes at 10:50 p.m.<sup>319</sup>

Another five of the people who spoke with President Trump that night were employees or outside advisors who counseled him on communications issues. These calls, by contrast, predominantly took place after the joint session resumed.<sup>320</sup> He spoke with his communications director, Scavino, twice: for 7 minutes at 7:08 p.m. and for 15 minutes at 9:55 p.m.<sup>321</sup> He spoke with McEnany for 11 minutes at 9:42 p.m.<sup>322</sup> He took calls from Steve Bannon, for 7 minutes at 10:19 p.m., and Sean Hannity, for 8 minutes at 11:08 p.m.<sup>323</sup>

At 9:23 p.m., President Trump spoke with Jason Miller, his Campaign Communications Director, for 18 minutes.<sup>324</sup>

Of his own initiative, Miller had drafted a statement for the President assuring the nation that the transfer of power—despite the day’s events—would, indeed, take place.<sup>325</sup> On their call, the President pushed back on the phrasing.

The President wanted the statement to promise a “peaceful transition” of power, rather than just an “orderly” one.<sup>326</sup>

Miller rejected the change and told him why rather bluntly.

“[T]hat ship’s kind of already sailed,” he said, “so we’re going to say ‘orderly transition.’ ”<sup>327</sup>

### 7.13 HE “JUST DIDN’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT ANYMORE”

The President did not, by any account, express grief or regret for what happened at the Capitol. Neither did he appear to grasp the gravity of what he had set in motion.

In his last phone call of the night, the President spoke with Johnny McEntee, his Director of Personnel.<sup>328</sup>

“[T]his is a crazy day,” the President told him. McEntee said his tone was one of “[l]ike, wow, can you believe this shit . . . ?”<sup>329</sup>

Did he express sadness over the violence visited upon the Capitol?

“No,” McEntee said. “I mean, I think he was shocked by, you know, it getting a little out of control, but I don’t remember sadness, specifically.”<sup>330</sup>

President Trump didn’t make any other phone calls for the rest of the night.<sup>331</sup> The President didn’t call Vice President Pence. In fact, President Trump never called to check on his Vice President’s safety that day. He didn’t call the heads of any of the Federal law enforcement agencies. He didn’t call the leadership—neither Republican nor Democrat—of the legislative branch of government that had just been overrun by a mob.<sup>332</sup>

Only two days after the riot, by January 8th, the President was over the whole thing.

He “just didn’t want to talk about it anymore,” he told his press aides. “[H]e was tired of talking about it.”<sup>333</sup>

Ivanka Trump claimed to the Select Committee that her father was “disappointed and surprised” by the attack, but she could not name a specific instance of him expressly saying it.

“He—I just felt that,” she said. “I know him really well.”<sup>334</sup>

Here’s what she could definitively say:

Committee Staff: Has he ever expressed to you any sentiment that he did or did not do the right thing in how he responded on the day of the 6th?

Ms. Trump: No.

Committee Staff: Has he ever expressed any sentiment about something that he wished he had done on the day of the 6th?

Ms. Trump: No.

Committee Staff: Has he ever said anything to you about the people who were injured or who died that day?

Ms. Trump: No.

Committee Staff: Has he ever said anything to you about whether he should or should not continue to talk about the 2020 Presidential election after the events on the 6th?

Ms. Trump: No.<sup>335</sup>

#### **7.14 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S “RHETORIC KILLED SOMEONE”**

The President may not have expressed regret over his behavior, but some of his most loyal supporters made the connection between his words and the violence.

A member of the speechwriting team, Patrick MacDonnell, conceded the next day in a text that “maybe the rhetoric could have been better.”<sup>336</sup> As the riot was in full throttle, even steadfast supporter Ali Alexander of “Stop the Steal” texted, “POTUS is not ignorant of what his words will do.”<sup>337</sup>

“We all look like domestic terrorists now,” Hope Hicks texted Julie Radford.<sup>338</sup>

Separately, Hicks texted Herschmann, “So predictable and so sad.”

“I know,” he replied. “Tragic.”

“I’m so upset. Everything we worked for wiped away,” she continued.

“I agree. Totally self-inflicted,” he wrote.<sup>339</sup>

Brad Parscale, Trump’s Former Campaign Manager, texted Katrina Pierson at 7:21 p.m. on January 6th, saying the day’s events were the result of a “sitting president asking for civil war.”<sup>340</sup>

“This week I feel guilty for helping him win . . . a woman is dead,” Parscale added.

“You do realize this was going to happen,” Pierson answered.

“Yeah. If I was trump [sic] and knew my rhetoric killed someone,” he said.

“It wasn’t the rhetoric,” she said.

Parscale’s reply: “Yes it was.”<sup>341</sup>

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## ENDNOTES

1. As explained in Chapter 8, the Proud Boys and other extremists initiated the attack shortly before the joint session of Congress was set to begin at 1:00 p.m. The rioters who streamed down Pennsylvania to the U.S. Capitol from the Ellipse then provided crucial momentum for the attack.
2. “Manual for Courts-Martial United States,” Department of Defense, (2019), at 334, available at [https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20\(Final\)%20\(20190108\).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610](https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610).
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296.
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (October 25, 2022), pp. 108-110; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC\_HH\_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).
8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC\_HH\_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).
9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC\_HH\_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).
10. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at <https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346904110969315332.jpg> (archived).
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 39-41.
12. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925 (January 6, 2021, Donald Trump Jr. text message to Mark Meadows at 2:53 p.m. ET).

13. At 3:13 p.m., President Trump tweeted: “I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order—respect the Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:13 p.m. ET, available at <https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346912780700577792.jpg> (archived).
14. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump’s Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/>.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
16. “New Video of Capitol Rioter: ‘Trump is Still Our President,’” CNN Business, at 0:37, Feb. 6, 2021, available at <https://www.cnn.com/videos/media/2021/02/06/qanon-capitol-rioter-video-trump-still-president-sot-nr-vpx.cnn>.
17. Trial Exhibit 6732 (1.S.159.1165-67, 84), *United States v. Rhodes et al.*, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2022). Vallejo was manning the quick reaction force at a hotel in Arlington, Virginia, awaiting word to bring in a cache of weaponry; he was not at the Capitol on January 6th. Trial Exhibit 6731, *United States v. Rhodes et al.*, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (Vallejo messaged his group in the afternoon “QRF standing by at hotel. Just say the word”); Trial Transcript at 2728, *United States v. Rhodes et al.*, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2022) (Oath Keeper Terry Cummings testified that “I had not seen that many weapons in one location since I was in the military” when he arrived at the Arlington hotel).
18. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript>.
19. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript>.
20. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:01 ET, available at <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-january-6-2021> (archived).
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 125.
22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 157.
23. Mariana Alfaro, “Trump Vows Pardon, Government Apology to Capitol Rioters if Elected,” *Washington Post*, (Sept. 1, 2022), available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/>.
24. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:06 a.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Sleepy+Eyes+Chuck+Todd+is+so+happy%22> (archived).
25. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22All+Mike+Pence+has+to+do+is%22> (archived).
26. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:22 a.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1> (archived).
27. Documents with file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January 6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 8:23 a.m. ET).

28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January 6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 8:23 a.m. ET). The Select Committee issued subpoenas to Bannon, Olson, and Giuliani in order to learn more about these telephone conversations, among other things. Bannon refused to comply with his subpoena, leading to his referral and ultimate conviction for criminal contempt of Congress. Olson sued to block the Select Committee from enforcing his subpoena. Giuliani spoke with the Select Committee but asserted attorney-client privilege with respect to all of his telephone conversations with President Trump on January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 198.
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January 6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 9:02 a.m. ET); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 12.
30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 145.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 112; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW\_0002633 (Jan. 4, 2021, email at 10:00 p.m. from Ross Worthington to Patrick McDonnell asking for research related to the January 6th speech).
32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW\_0002341–RW\_0002351 (Jan. 6, 2021, Stephen Miller emails to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley and Robert Gabriel, Jr. at 10:22 and 10:23 a.m. ET, attaching draft speech).
33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW\_0002341–2344 (Jan. 6, 2021, email from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS, attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).
34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW\_0002341–2343 (Jan. 6, 2021, email from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS, attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Vincent Haley, (April 12, 2022), pp. 88–89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Miller, (April 14, 2022), p. 148.
36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007430\_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Ross Worthington email to Vincent M. Haley at 10:49 a.m. ET).
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 154.
38. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 9:00 a.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22they+just+happened+to+find%22> (archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 9:15 a.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22they+states+want+to+redo%22> (archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 9:16 a.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22even+Mexico%22> (archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 10:44 a.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22these+scoundrels+are+only+toying%22> (archived).

39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the Capitol, (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (January 6, 2021, Schedule marked private with handwritten notes at 11:22 a.m. ET); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021) pp. 90–93; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2021), p. 126.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 48–49; *see also* Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 22 (“I could just tell in his voice when he was talking to the Vice President that he was disappointed and frustrated.”).
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 4.
42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2020), p. 18.
43. *Compare* Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (January 6, 2021, schedule with handwritten notes about the meeting); *with* Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000100198 (communication noting “Mogul” en route to the Ellipse at 11:39 a.m.).
44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 93.
45. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P\_R000007558\_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Stephen Miller email to Robert Gabriel Jr.).
46. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531\_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Robert Gabriel Jr. email to Ross Worthington at 11:33 a.m. ET).
47. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P\_R000007531\_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Ross Worthington email to Robert Gabriel Jr. at 11:34 a.m. ET).
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Vincent Haley, (Apr. 12, 2022), p. 95.
49. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW\_0002341–2343 (January 6, 2021, email from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS, attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).
50. *See* Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Vincent Haley, (Apr. 12, 2022), p. 95; Document on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007557\_0001, 076P-R000007557\_0034, 076P-R000002896\_00001, 076P-R000002896\_00025, 076P-R000002984\_0001, 076P-R000002984\_00304 (various drafts, including teleprompter inputs, of the speech).
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 126.
52. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000286 (January 6, 2021, note from Nicholas Luna to President Trump).
53. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL000011236 (January. 6, 2021, Email Re: CSD Activity Log #2 at 2:49 p.m. ET).

54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 87–88; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000005179\_0001-0002 (January 6, 2021 email reporting on the status of people going through the magnetometers and noting “[s]everal thousand on the mall watching but not in line.”).
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12–13.
56. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069, (January 6, 2021, Cassidy Hutchinson text message to Tony Ornato at 12:45 p.m. ET).
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 15–16; *see also* Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th> (“[W]e were standing towards the front of the tent with the TVs really close to where he would walk out to go on to the stage. These conversations happened two to three minutes before he took the stage that morning”).
58. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 11:55 a.m. ET).
59. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6> (time-stamping the speech).
60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069 (January 6, 2021, Cassidy Hutchinson text message to Tony Ornato at 12:45 p.m. ET).
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
62. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002879\_00001 (“Save America March” speech early draft); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 157.
63. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” *NPR*, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at <https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial>.
64. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6> (timestamping the speech).
65. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6> (time-stamping the speech); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alex Holder Production) Video file Clip [45DAY32CAMB0050.mov](#) at 3:10–3:40 (capturing “fight for Trump” chants during Donald Trump, Jr.’s speech); Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,” *ProPublica*, at 12:01 pm at 3:33 and at 12:05 pm at 0:30 (Jan. 17, 2021), available at <https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/> (capturing “fight for Trump” chants droning out the President after he told the crowd “we will not let them silence your voices”); FORMER WAGIE, “FULL FOOTAGE: Patriots STORM U.S. Capitol,” YouTube, at 59:00, Jan. 6, 2021, posted Jan. 8, 2021, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNFcdpZdkh0>.

66. Brian Naylor, "Read Trump's Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial," *NPR*, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at <https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial>.
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>. *But see* Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 129 ("It wasn't—he didn't give me an impressions that he was frustrated or angry at the prospect of what the President had said on the stage. It was more of him trying to rush to get insight on what our plans were and wanted to have insight and be read in on that in case we had been planning to go up to the Capitol.").
68. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp.128–29; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000176702.
72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001005-1026 (January 6, 2021, National Security Council staff chat logs); *See* Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 47 (discussing clearing a route to the Capitol for "Mogul").
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45.
76. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061 (January 6, 2021, email to Robert Engel at 1:19 p.m. ET). Despite the fact that the prospect of an OTR to the Capitol was raised at the highest levels within the Secret Service, some of its highest-ranking agents insisted to the Select Committee that they did not recall any such discussions on the day of January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Engel, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 77. When presented with his text messages with Cassidy Hutchinson in which she referred to an "OTR to Capitol," Tony Ornato insisted that he didn't "recall ever talking about this with her." Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), p. 62.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 117.
78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000257 (January 6, 2021, Presidential Daily Diary).

80. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press Secretary,” (October 31, 2022), pp. 49–51 (the word “furious” was “consistent with what was described to me that occurred—you know, agitated, furious, upset, angry, whatever adjective”).
81. Mark Meadows, *The Chief's Chief*, (St. Petersburg: All Seasons Press, 2021), at p. 250 (“When he got offstage, President Trump let me know that he had been speaking metaphorically about the walk to the Capitol. . . . It was clear the whole time that he didn’t actually intent to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue with the crowd.”).
82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Robert Engel, (Mar. 4, 2022).
83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 158–62.
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 159.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 160.
86. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 5–8.
87. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 90; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 71; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022) p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022) pp. 35–36.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 5.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 5.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 6–7.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee with National Security Responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp. 69–71.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee with National Security Responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), p. 71.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 143–44, 147–48.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 21, 2022), pp. 92–93.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee with National Security Responsibilities (July 19, 2022), p. 73 (“In the days following that, I do remember, you know, again, hearing again how angry the President was when, you know, they were in the limo.”)
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Sep. 14, 2022), pp. 34, 36, 37–38, 55.

98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 18, 23.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 4, 2022), pp. 99–100.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press Secretary,” (Oct. 31, 2022), pp. 46, 50.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press Secretary,” (Oct. 31, 2022), p. 50; see also Carol Leonnig (@CarolLeonnig), Twitter, June 28, 2022 7:46 p.m. ET, available at <https://twitter.com/CarolLeonnig/status/1541931078184845312>. The press secretary confirmed that he or she confirmed this information to the reporter because “that’s what I had been told.” “[Engel] did indicate—you know, kind of outlined . . . that the President did want to go to the Capitol, and Mr. Engel advised that we cannot go,” the press secretary testified. “And you know, [President Trump] was agitated, but Mr. Engel advised that—you know, it was kind of a non-issue. It was agitated verbally, and they proceeded to the White House.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press Secretary,” (Oct. 31, 2022), pp. 46, 50.
102. The Select Committee has agreed not to name the Secret Service agent who was driving the vehicle to protect his privacy. We will refer to him in this report as “the driver.”
103. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 100–01.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 100–01.
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 79.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78. This recollection of the President’s phrasing seems very similar to Hutchinson’s testimony about President Trump’s statement before he took the stage at the Ellipse: “I’m the President. Take the F’ing mags away. They’re not here to hurt me.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 11–12.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 78, 92.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 102. Mr. Engel also did not recall another occasion where testimony indicates that the incident in the presidential vehicle was mentioned. Mr. Engel’s counsel has asked the Committee not to make certain evidence relating to that occasion public.

113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 143–44, 147–48.
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 80.
115. The Justice Department will have all of the relevant information and can make decisions about whether and how to proceed based upon this evidence.
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 121.
117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 at p. 4 (January 6, 2021, PID update at 1:25 p.m.).
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 18–19.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 121.
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 125.
121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061 (January 6 2021, email from Robert Engel at 1:55 p.m.).
122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27.
123. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27.
124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file 40a8\_hi\_j0087\_0bea.
125. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 27–28.
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
127. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump). *See also* Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000028 (Memorandum from White House Diarist confirming that “[t]he Oval Log for January 6, 2021 was not received”).
130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p 29 (“Why did that change, that you were not taking any records?” “I don’t recall a specific reason.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 111–12 (attributing the lack of recordkeeping to Michael’s absence in the

- White House, though she was present in the Outer Oval during the afternoon); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Austin Ferrer Piran Basualdo, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 86.
131. H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Ssess. (2021), available at <https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf>; H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d sess. (2022), available at <https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf>.
  132. *See, e.g.*, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 155–57.
  133. *See, e.g.*, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 136 (“The phones were ringing. A lot was happening. I don’t recall.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Austin Ferrer Piran Basualdo, (Apr. 8, 2022), pp. 109–10 (“I don’t remember where I was that afternoon.” “Do you remember being at the White House that afternoon, even if you don’t remember where exactly you were in the White House?” “No, I do not.” “Do you remember being home, wherever home is for you, on the afternoon of January 6th, as opposed to being at the White House?” “No, I don’t.” “So you don’t remember whether you were at home or at the White House in the afternoon of January 6th, 2021?” “Again, that day was very blurry.”).
  134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), p. 46.
  135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), p. 46. It is the standard practice of the White House photographers to cover the President from the moment he steps out of the residence until he returns there at the end of the day. *Id.* at 7. Craighead pushed back, telling Michael that the White House would want to document the day for historical purposes, but Michael did not relent. *Id.* at p. 28.
  136. *See, e.g.*, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 115 (“Well, I saw the President watching TV.”).
  137. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 23.
  138. *See, e.g.*, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 64 (“I recall walking in and saying, ‘You have to put out a strong statement condemning violence and asking for peace to be restored.’”).
  139. *See, e.g.*, Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022); *See also* Jonathan Karl, *Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show*, (New York: Dutton, 2021), p. 287.
  140. *See, e.g.*, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126–27.
  141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 129.

142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 169–70.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 159–60.
144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC\_000000724 (Jan. 6, 2021, Kayleigh McEnany notes).
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 164.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 164.
148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC\_000000724 (Jan. 6, 2021, Kayleigh McEnany notes).
149. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Honorable Kevin McCarthy, (May 12, 2022), available at <https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-McCarthy%20Kevin%20%28002%29.pdf>; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Representative Jim Jordan, (May 12, 2022), available at <https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-Jordan%20Jim%20%28002%29.pdf>.
150. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Honorable Kevin McCarthy, (May 12, 2022), available at <https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-McCarthy%20Kevin%20%28002%29.pdf>; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Representative Jim Jordan, (May 12, 2022), available at <https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-Jordan%20Jim%20%28002%29.pdf>.
151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
152. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2020 1:49 p.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FizItBeFE6G%22> (archived).
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 144.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 145.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Benjamin Williamson, (Jan. 25, 2022) p. 60. Live feeds of the Capitol began showing pepper spray exchanges between officers and rioters around 1:29 p.m. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000094153; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000094192; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 40:00, available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.

156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 36–37.
157. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Benjamin Williamson Production), CTRL0000034784 (Jan. 6, 2021, Benjamin Williamson text message to Mark Meadows at 2:02 p.m. EST); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Benjamin Williamson (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 24 (“I saw that he was sitting on his couch on his cell phone, same as the morning, where he was just kind of scrolling and typing.”).
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 24.
160. The Select Committee’s review of U.S. Capitol Police surveillance footage showed that Proud Boy Dominic Pezzola smashed a Senate Wing window at 2:13 p.m. and rioters entered through that window, as well as an adjacent door, shortly thereafter. *See also* Third Superseding Indictment at 21, *United States v. Nordean et al.*, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola “used [a] riot shield . . . to break a window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and that “[t]he first members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken window”); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at <https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf>.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 25. Cipollone confirmed that he first went to the dining room when he saw that “people had breached the Capitol, they had gotten into the Capitol.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 149.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26. Cipollone did not elaborate but testified generally that he was “very upset about what was happening” at the Capitol and wanted “action to be taken related to that.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 149.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
168. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Mike+Pence+didn%E2%80%99t+have+%22> (archived).
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.

171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27. President Trump himself has defended publicly the rioters who chanted “Hang Mike Pence!” In an interview, journalist Jonathan Karl asked President Trump about the chants. “Well, the people were very angry,” he responded. The President continued: “Because it’s common sense . . . How can you—if you know a vote is fraudulent, how can you pass a fraudulent vote to Congress? How can you do it?” Jonathan Karl, *Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show*, (New York: Dutton, 2021), p. 340.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27. Hutchinson recalled one other thing that Meadows said, referring to the tweet attacking Vice President Pence: “[T]his is the best we’re going to get for now.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 17. Hutchinson believes that this conversation took place after the 2:24 p.m. tweet, but the context suggests that it may have taken place after the 2:38 p.m. or 3:13 p.m. tweets.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.
174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.
175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:29:45–1:31:50, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo>.
177. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095185.
178. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095247.
179. Lauren Fox and Clare Foran, “GOP Sen. Mike Lee Hands Over Phone Records to House Impeachment Managers,” CNN, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/13/politics/mike-lee-phone-records-impeachment-trial/index.html>.
180. Mike Lillis, “Tuberville Defends Account of Trump Call During Capitol Riot,” *The Hill*, (Feb. 12, 2021), available at <https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/538704-tuberville-defends-account-of-trump-call-during-capitol-riot/>. Sen. Tuberville stated publicly that the originating number was identified as “White House” on Sen. Lee’s phone, suggesting that the call came through the White House Switchboard. *Id.*
181. Jonathan Karl, *Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show*, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at p. 287.
182. Jonathan Karl, *Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show*, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at p. 287.
183. Eddie Burkhalter, “Tuberville Says He Attended Jan. 5 Fundraiser at Trump’s Washington Hotel,” *Alabama Political Reporter*, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at <https://www.alreporter.com/2021/02/19/tuberville-says-he-attended-jan-5-fundraiser-at-trumps-washington-hotel/>.
184. The call likely happened after the evacuation of the House chamber starting at approximately 2:38 p.m., and Rep. McCarthy spoke about it to CBS News’s Norah O’Donnell by phone between approximately 3:00 to 3:15 p.m. CBS News, “House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: I Completely Condemn the Violence in the Capitol,” YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpBbqqO5qGU>. Molly Michael testified that she

recalls receiving the incoming call from Leader McCarthy on Dan Scavino's landline and transferring it to a landline in the dining room. She does not recall when the call took place, nor did she hear anything about what was discussed. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), pp. 131–32.

185. "House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: 'I Completely Condemn the Violence in the Capitol,'" CBS News, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://www.cbsnews.com/video/house-minority-leader-kevin-mccarthy-condemn-the-violence/#x>.
186. "House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: 'I Completely Condemn the Violence in the Capitol,'" CBS News, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://www.cbsnews.com/video/house-minority-leader-kevin-mccarthy-condemn-the-violence/#x>.
187. Tommy Christopher, "WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump's Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters," Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/>.
188. Tommy Christopher, "WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump's Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters," Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/>.
189. Tommy Christopher, "WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump's Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters," Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/>.
190. Tommy Christopher, "WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump's Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters," Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/>.
191. Tommy Christopher, "WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump's Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters," Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/>.
192. Tommy Christopher, "WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump's Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters," Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/>.
193. Tommy Christopher, "WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trump's Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters," Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/>.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John Michael "Mick" Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), p. 43.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 46.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 46.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 47.
198. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW\_0002307 (Jan. 6, 2021, Gabriel Roberts text message at 2:49 p.m.).

199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 72.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 68; *see also* Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 68–69.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 70.
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 69 (“And she was in there for a few minutes, and then came out and he had issued a tweet.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 64 (“Within, I believe, a few minutes he had issued that—he put out that tweet, a version of that tweet.”).
203. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22please+support+our%22> (archived).
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 87–89.
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 88.
206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC\_000000724, (January 6, 2021, Kayleigh McEnany Notes); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 185.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 88–89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 185.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
211. Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker, *I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J. Trump’s Catastrophic Final Year* (New York: Penguin, 2021), p. 474.
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 91.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 141.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 170.
215. Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, *Peril*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 248.
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 32.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 30.

218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 37; Hutchinson recalls that Meadows, Herschmann, Ivanka Trump, and others would come and go from the Chief of Staff's office at intervals throughout the afternoon. "I don't know if it was for a breather or to have a conversation away from the dining room," she said. *Id.*, at 31.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 38.
220. Fox News, "U.S. Capitol on Lockdown as Protests Threaten Security," YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFWGBnJ0rQA>.
221. Fox News, "Breaking News: Protestors Now inside U.S. Capitol," YouTube, at 2:40, Jan. 6, 2021, available at <https://www.fox29.com/video/887421>.
222. Fox News, "Pro-Trump Protestors Storm U.S. Capitol," YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tVPSYr-xG6s>.
223. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095389.
224. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095393 (Jan. 6, 2021, text between Secret Service agents at 2:41 p.m. EST).
225. Marshall Cohen and Avery Lotz, "The January 6 Insurrection: Minute-by-Minute," CNN, (July 29, 2022), available at <https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/10/politics/jan-6-us-capitol-riot-timeline/index.html>.
226. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000241 (Jan. 6, 2021, Note to President Trump).
227. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 46–47.
228. *See, e.g.*, Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014921, MM014923, MM014926.
229. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906. Recently, Representative Greene has qualified her stance on armed rioters at the Capitol. At a Young Republicans event in New York, she said: "I got to tell you something, if Steve Bannon and I had organized [January 6th], we would have won. Not to mention, it would've been armed." She claims she was joking. Aaron Blake, "Analysis: Marjorie Taylor Greene's Jan. 6 'Joke' Has Been Building for a Long Time," *Washington Post*, (Dec. 12, 2022), available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/12/12/greene-january-6-punchline/>.
230. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014907, MM014908, MM014909, (Jan. 6, 2021, Laura Ingraham text message to Mark Meadows at 2:32 pm); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014911 (Jan. 6, 2021, Laura Ingraham text message to Mark Meadows at 2:32 p.m.).
231. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014912.
232. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014914, MM014915.
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014921.
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014922.

235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014919.
236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014923.
237. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.
238. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014926.
239. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014928.
240. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000240 (January 6, 2021 proposed statement).
241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
244. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:13 p.m. EST, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22remain+peaceful%22> (archived).
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 119.
246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 88.
247. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 88; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 172; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 155.
248. "Pergram: Most Significant Breach of Government Institution Since 1814," Fox News, Jan. 6, 2021, available at <https://www.foxnews.com/video/6220760122001#sp=show-clips>.
249. Fox News, "Individual Shot in U.S. Capitol," YouTube, at 1:59, Jan. 6, 2021, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oL-M0LuE3HK>.
250. "Andy McCarthy Blasts Pro-Trump Protesters after Breach at Capitol," Fox News, at 1:28, Jan. 6, 2021, available at <https://www.foxnews.com/video/6220757649001#sp=show-clips>.
251. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014932, MM014934.
252. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014935. This was sent from a phone number associated with Priebus's family member.
253. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014936.
254. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014937.

255. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014939.
256. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014943.
257. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.
258. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014947.
259. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014948.
260. Document on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014949.
261. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014956, MM014957.
262. Document on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014961.
263. Document on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014964.
264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>; see also CBS News, "House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: 'I completely condemn the violence in the Capitol,'" YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpBbpqO5qgU>.
266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>.
267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 22, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 163.
268. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:17 p.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2Fp2PKV0Fp3%22> (archived).
269. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
270. "Bill Hemmer Reports," Fox News, at 3:56 p.m. ET, available at [https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW\\_20210106\\_200000\\_Bill\\_Hemmer\\_Reports/start/3360/end/3420](https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20210106_200000_Bill_Hemmer_Reports/start/3360/end/3420) (archived).
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 162–63.
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 162.
273. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Video file 40983.

274. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 234. President Trump did not react to her suggestion, McEnany said. *See id.*
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 161; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 97–99.
277. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:17 p.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FpM2PKV0Fp3%22> (archived).
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file 4243\_hi\_j0233\_61ae.
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 182. *See* Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 49–50 (remembering that someone in the Rose Garden told the President something along the lines “that he needed to use stronger, more forceful” language in the video).
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 99.
281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 181.
282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:58:30, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo>.
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>. (“[A]s soon as that come out, everybody started talking about it and that’s—it seemed like it started to disperse.”).
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th> (“Basically, when President Trump put his tweet out. We literally left right after that [had] come out.”).
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, *Hearing on the January 6th Investigation*, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th>. (“[I]f he would have done that earlier in the day, 1:30, I—you know, we wouldn’t be in this—maybe we wouldn’t be in this bad of a situation or something.”).
286. “Bill Hemmer Reports,” Fox News, Jan. 6, 2021, available at [https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW\\_20210106\\_200000\\_Bill\\_Hemmer\\_Reports/start/780/end/840](https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20210106_200000_Bill_Hemmer_Reports/start/780/end/840).
287. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2020 6:01 p.m. ET, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22> (archived).
288. T, available at <https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22> (archived).
289. *See* Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53.

290. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives production), Photo file 364c\_hi\_j0246\_2fa8.
291. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53.
292. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
294. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
295. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
299. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
300. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
301. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
302. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
303. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 206. (“You were leaving messages or having phone calls with United States Senators about the joint session of Congress. How could that possibly be [a] privileged conversation?” “Because the conversation is about the theory of the case, and my representation of the client.”).
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 207.
307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 206; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert O’Brien Production), NSA 0040 (January 6, 2021, text message from Sen. Mike Lee to Robert O’Brien at 10:55 p.m. EST reading, “You can’t make this up. I just got this voice message [from] Rudy Giuliani, who apparently thought he was calling Senator Tuberville.” “You’ve got to listen to that message. Rudy is walking malpractice.”).

308. Steve Hayes, “Giuliani to Senator: ‘Try to Just Slow it Down,’” *The Dispatch*, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://thedispatch.com/p/giuliani-to-senator-try-to-just-slow>.
309. Steve Hayes, “Giuliani to Senator: ‘Try to Just Slow it Down,’” *The Dispatch*, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://thedispatch.com/p/giuliani-to-senator-try-to-just-slow>.
310. Those 13 people are Pat Cipollone, Dan Scavino, Kurt Olsen, Mark Martin, Cleta Mitchell, Rudy Giuliani, Kayleigh McEnany, Jason Miller, Mark Meadows, Steve Bannon, Eric Herschmann, Sean Hannity, and John McEntee. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000261 (Jan. 6, 2021, the Presidential Call Log).
311. H. Rept. 117-152, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Stephen K. Bannon in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st sess. (2021), available at <https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt152/CRPT-117hrpt152.pdf>; H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st sess. (2021), available at <https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf>; H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d sess. (2022), available at <https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf>; Erik Larson, “Lawyer Who Talked to Trump on Day of Capitol Riot Sues over Subpoena,” *Bloomberg*, (Mar. 25, 2022), available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-25/lawyer-who-talked-to-trump-on-day-of-mob-riot-sues-over-subpoena> (discussing Kurt Olsen); Caleb Ecarma, “Sean Hannity Wants the January 6 Committee to Believe He’s a Journalist,” *Vanity Fair*, (Jan. 5, 2022), available at <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/01/sean-hannity-january-6-committee-journalist>.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 195.
313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), p. 131; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 211.
314. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump); “WATCH: ‘Let’s Get Back to Work,’ Pence Urges Senate,” PBS, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-lets-get-back-to-work-pence-urges-senate>.
315. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
316. Olsen authored a memo urging Vice President Pence to adjourn the joint session of Congress without counting electoral votes. See Documents on file with the Select Committee on the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production) Chapman004979 (Jan. 2, 2021, Kurt Olsen Draft Memorandum Entitled, “The Role of the Vice President in Receiving Votes from the Electoral College.”) Martin advised President Trump that Vice President Pence possessed the constitutional authority to impede the electoral

count. See Nicholas Fandos, Peter Baker, and Maggie Haberman, “House Moves to Force Trump Out, Vowing Impeachment if Pence Won’t Act,” *New York Times*, (Jan. 10, 2021), available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/us/politics/trump-impeachment.html>. Both corresponded with John Eastman and others regarding plans to convene alternate electors in states won by Joe Biden. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman023998 (Dec. 6, 2020, Michael Farris email forwarding an email concerning the “Importance of Republican Electors in AZ, GA, MI, NV, PA and WI Voting on Dec 14” at 1:54 p.m. ET). President Trump asked to speak with Mr. Olsen and Mr. Martin before he left the dining room. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R00007401\_00001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Molly Michael email to MBX WHO MA Joint White House Switchboard at 11:28 p.m. ET).

317. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
318. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump). Mitchell declined to discuss her conversations with President Trump on attorney-client privilege grounds. She did, however, acknowledge that following the phone call, she took steps to dismiss the President’s pending election suit in Georgia. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), p. 131.
319. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118 (Herschmann refused to answer questions about the phone call, citing executive privilege).
320. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
321. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
322. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
323. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
324. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 258–59.
326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 258.
327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 258.

328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 160–61; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump).
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 161.
330. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 161.
331. Insert: Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump).
332. Documents with file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
333. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 42–43.
334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 179–80.
335. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 180.
336. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Patrick MacDonnell Production), PM000158 (Jan. 7, 2021, Patrick MacDonnell text message to personal contact at 9:46 p.m. EST).
337. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ali Alexander Production), CTRL0000017719, p. 3; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander, (Dec. 9, 2021), p. 57.
338. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC\_HH\_042.
339. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC\_HH\_040.
340. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0717 (Jan. 6, 2021, Brad Parscale text message to Katrina Pierson at 7:14 p.m. ET).
341. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0718– KPierson20 (Jan. 6, 2021, Brad Parscale text message to Katrina Pierson at 7:22 p.m. ET).